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I.

INTRODUCTION

I am an American corporate law scholar, and I champion worker
involvement in corporate governance. 1 It’s a lonely life. I ponder whether
workers should throw in their lot behind managers or shareholders, the Great
Powers of American corporate governance,2 while dreaming enviously of
German codetermination. The growth of stakeholderism has made it easier
to find some partial allies, both in the movement towards shareholder
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) activism in public companies
(where I have considered how corporate and securities law can be used to
address climate change) 3 and in the growth of social enterprise in closely
1. Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism
at Work, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 334 (2008) [hereinafter Employee Primacy]; Brett H.
McDonnell, Strategies for an Employee Role in Corporate Governance, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 429, 430 (2011); Brett H. McDonnell & Matthew D. Bodie, From Mandates to
Governance: Restructuring the Employment Relationship, 81 MD. L. REV. 887, 916 (2022)
[hereinafter Mandates to Governance].
2. I generally side with shareholders. Brett H. McDonnell, Shareholder Bylaws,
Shareholder Nominations, and Poison Pills, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 205, 249–50 (2005)
[hereinafter Shareholder Bylaws]; Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Executive Compensation
and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 333 (2009)
[hereinafter Penumbra].
3. Brett H. McDonnell et al., Green Boardrooms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. 335, 335 (2021)
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held companies. 4 But these partial allies only endorse having managers or
shareholders look out for the interest of workers and other stakeholders;
precious few advocate more active empowerment.
So, what am I to make of Leo Strine? Friend or foe? While he was
Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, he wrote two of the most
powerful defenses of the proposition that corporations must ultimately be run
in the interest of their shareholders, and their shareholders alone. 5 And yet,
for years he has shown some affinity for the interests of workers 6 and other
ESG matters, 7 and recently he has co-written an article making a (guarded)
case for worker representation on corporate boards, along with increased
support of unions and German-style works councils. 8
Can these two Strines be reconciled? That is the question I ask in this
essay. Part II explores the arguments of Justice Strine, defender of
Delaware’s emphasis on the interest of shareholders. I believe that Strine
provides the best argument for focusing the fiduciary duty of directors and

[hereinafter Green Boards].
4. Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in
Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 19 (2014) [hereinafter Committing];
Brett H. McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social
Enterprise, 70 ALA. L. REV. 77, 78 (2018) [hereinafter Duty to Power]; Brett McDonnell, The
Corrosion Critique of Benefit Corporations, 101 B.U. L. REV. 1421, 1426 (2021).
5. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit
Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136 (2012) [hereinafter Our
Continuing Struggle]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed
Understanding of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware
General Corporation Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 767 (2015) [hereinafter Dangers
of Denial].
6. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the
Shared Interests of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate
Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2007) [hereinafter Common Ground]; Leo E. Strine, Jr. &
Kirby M. Smith, Toward Fair Gainsharing and a Quality Workplace for Employees: How a
Reconceived Compensation Committee Might Help Make Corporations More Responsible
Employers and Restore Faith in American Capitalism, 76 BUS. LAW. 31, 31 (2020)
[hereinafter Fair Gainsharing]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism 3
(Aug. 13, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Roosevelt Institute) [hereinafter
Fair and Sustainable].
7. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Caremark and ESG, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach
to Implementing an Integrated, Efficient, and Effective Caremark and EESG Strategy, 106
IOWA L. REV. 1885, 1885 (2021) [hereinafter Caremark & ESG]; Chris Brummer & Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Duty and Diversity 1 (Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Penn Law Legal Scholarship Repository) [hereinafter Duty and Diversity].
8. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Aneil Kovvali & Oluwatomi O. Williams, Lifting Labor’s Voice:
A Principled Path Toward Greater Worker Voice and Power Within American Corporate
Governance, 106 Minn. L. Rev. 1325, 1325 (2022) [hereinafter Labor’s Voice].
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officers on the interest of shareholders. Corporate law empowers
shareholders, and only shareholders, in electing the board and voting along
with the board on certain fundamental matters as well as granting
shareholders alone the right to sue for fiduciary duty violations. A duty to
shareholders alone reflects the reality of this distribution of power. Even if
the law were to instruct directors to consider the interests of other
stakeholders, the reality of shareholder voting power would cause them to
focus on shareholders. 9
Part III considers various arguments Dr. Leo the academic 10 makes for
ways in which the law can protect workers and other stakeholder interests
while duty and power remain tied to shareholders alone. He repeats
arguments that already exist in the corporate law literature, but with useful
elaborations. Other areas of regulation outside of corporate law, such as
labor, employment, and environmental law, should be used to address
worker protection and climate change. 11 Board oversight spurred by the
Caremark duty to monitor legal compliance 12 can improve ESG
performance. 13
Regulation of shareholder activism can encourage
shareholders to focus on long-term interests congruent with ESG goals. 14 I
find much merit in these arguments. I also find significant limitations—even
collectively, these measures are likely to fall far short of adequately
protecting workers or addressing climate change. 15
It may be that Strine realizes this as well. Part IV explores one of his
most recent articles, 16 where Strine advocates worker representation on
boards, works councils, and stronger unions. This strikes right at the heart
of the exclusive enfranchisement of shareholders which underlies Justice
Strine’s argument for understanding fiduciary duty as focused on the
interests of shareholders. I argue that this Strine is right. 17 American law
should do more to empower workers, putting them at the center of corporate
governance along with shareholders, directors, and officers.

9. See infra Part II.
10. The conceit of this article’s title would appear to grant Strine a phantom Ph.D.; surely
his encyclopedic knowledge and extreme productivity in producing academic articles justifies
that honor.
11. See infra Section III.A.
12. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–69 (Del. Ch. 1996).
13. See infra Section III.B.
14. See infra Section III.C.
15. See infra Part III.
16. Labor’s Voice, supra note 8.
17. See infra Part IV.
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JUSTICE STRINE AND SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY

A long-standing debate in corporate law concerns to whom the
fiduciary duty of corporate directors and officers runs. 18 Is it only to the
shareholders of a corporation, or does it extend to promoting the interests of
other corporate stakeholders (such as employees, creditors, customers, the
community, and the environment), even where doing so does not advance
the interests of shareholders? Most practitioners and scholars believe the
standard answer is that the duty requires maximizing shareholder wealth (in
the long run), but only a few prominent cases explicitly state that position:
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.; 19 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.; 20 and eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 21 most importantly.
While he was Chief Justice, Strine wrote two articles setting out and
defending the shareholder wealth maximization understanding. 22 He
analyzes the cases just noted for doctrinal support. More interestingly, he
develops an argument for why this is the right position for the courts to take.
He roots that argument in the statutory grant of power to shareholders under
statutory corporate law:
The DGCL’s design is intensely and intentionally stockholder
focused. For example, the statute makes clear that only
stockholders can bring derivative actions. In addition, only
stockholders have the right to vote for directors, to approve
certificate amendments, to amend the bylaws, and to vote on
important transactions such as mergers. In sum, under Delaware
corporation law, no constituency other than stockholders is given
any power. 23
Authority over most matters is granted to the board of directors. 24 But
the members of that board in turn are chosen by the shareholders, and only
the shareholders. Those shareholders must approve the fundamental actions
listed in the above quote. Those shareholders are the only stakeholders with
the power to bring derivative suits on behalf of the corporation enforcing
18. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 77 (2002).
19. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
20. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
21. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
22. Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 5, at 155; Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at
767–68.
23. Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at 784.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020).
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fiduciary duties. 25 Given all this, of course we should expect directors to
focus on the interests of those who chose them, can remove them, and can
sue them. What else could we expect? Advocates of understanding duty as
extending to the interests of other stakeholders ignore the reality created by
this power structure:
Instead of recognizing that for-profit corporations will seek profit
for their stockholders using all legal means available, we imbue
these corporations with a personality and assume they are moral
beings capable of being “better” in the long-run than the lowest
common denominator. We act as if entities in which only capital
has a vote will somehow be able to deny the stockholders their
desires, when a choice has to be made between profit for those
who control the board’s reelection prospects and positive
outcomes for the employees and communities who do not. 26
I think this is the best argument in favor of shareholder wealth
maximization. It points us to the core features of the corporate authority
structure. It forces us to think realistically about the likely ineffectiveness of
interpreting fiduciary duty as protecting stakeholders with no power over
directors and officers. Indeed, legal reformers attempting to devise new
forms for social enterprises intended to pursue social missions in addition to
generating profits for their investors would have done well to deeply
consider Strine’s argument before legislating. The leading new statutory
form for social enterprise, the benefit corporation, imposes a duty to consider
the interest of many stakeholders, but it gives those stakeholders (other than
shareholders) no power to either elect or remove directors or to sue to enforce
the duty to them. 27 How much effect will such a duty with no corresponding
power have on directors when push comes to shove in prioritizing the
interests of different parties? Most scholars, including myself, think the
answer is not much effect. 28 Strine pointed out the problem while making
his argument about duty in Delaware corporations. 29 As it becomes
increasingly clear that benefit corporations provide a weak solution to the
needs of social enterprises, future reformers should consider ways to give
25. Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at 748.
26. Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 5, at 136.
27. Committing, supra note 4, at 47–48.
28. Id. at 49.
29. Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 5, at 150–51. More recently, Strine has
suggested making it easier to become a benefit corporation, by requiring a simple majority
shareholder vote. Fair and Sustainable, supra note 6, at 12–13. I think his earlier skepticism
may be the stronger position. I myself have evolved from less to more skepticism. Compare
Committing, supra note 4, with Duty to Power, supra note 4.
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stakeholders more power. 30
But Strine does not only care about protecting shareholders. He clearly
cares deeply about better protecting workers than we currently do and about
other ESG matters as well, including addressing climate change. Won’t
corporations run by directors understanding their function in light of the
shareholder wealth maximization duty take advantage of their workers and
pollute the environment where doing so increases profits, even in the longrun (after taking into account things like reputational effects)? Strine
highlights this risk in his articles advocating shareholder primacy. How does
he think we should respond to such corporate irresponsibility?
III.

AMELIORATING CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY

Strine addressed this dilemma of corporate irresponsibility in his
original two articles advocating shareholder wealth maximization, as well as
in subsequent and prior work. One of the two shareholder primacy articles
has the following passage:
If we wish to make the corporation more socially responsible, we
must do it the proper way. If we believe that other constituencies
should be given more protection within corporation law itself, then
statutes should be adopted giving those constituencies enforceable
rights that they can wield. But a more effective and direct way to
protect interests such as the environment, workers, and consumers
would be to revive externality regulation. We must also address
the incentives and duties of institutional investors—who act as the
direct stockholders of most public companies—so that these
investors behave in a manner more consistent with the longer-term
investment horizon of the human beings whose capital they
control. 31
This passage points in several ways. The second sentence points to a
fundamental change in the power relationships that dictate the shareholderonly duty. We shall see Strine pursuing this possibility further in the next
Part. But the final two sentences go in a different direction. These take
shareholder power and consequent duty to them as given and suggest ways
to constrain the resulting single-minded focus on profits for shareholders.
The first way looks to other forms of external regulation, and is explored
here in Section III.A. The second way looks to shaping the behavior of

30. Duty to Power, supra note 4, at 112.
31. Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at 768.
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shareholders themselves to be more pro-social, and is explored here in
Section III.C. Other papers have suggested commandeering the Caremark
duty to monitor legal compliance, and that way is explored in Section III.B.
A. External Regulation
One of the leading themes of Strine’s shareholder primacy articles is
that the reality of corporations’ focus on shareholders makes it extremely
If
important to constrain behavior through external regulation. 32
corporations are emitting too much in greenhouse gases, then impose a
carbon tax, emissions trading, or other regulatory scheme. If they are
mistreating their employees, then improve employment regulation or make
it easier to unionize. The latter decades of the twentieth century saw a trend
towards deregulation in many areas of the law. 33 Strine’s message is that
deregulation needs to be reversed in a number of fields.
This is a common argument in corporate law, and one I have made
myself. The argument for contractual freedom and flexibility in corporate
law clearly needs to face the question of external effects on groups that are
not party to the corporate contract, and a standard answer is that where
external effects are a real problem, regulation through other areas of
substantive law is the answer. Even libertarians like Milton Friedman 34 and
Frank Easterbrook 35 make this argument. Given their general hostility to
legal regulation interfering with market relations, the argument rings rather
hollow coming from Friedman and Easterbrook, but it seems much more
genuine in the case of Strine.
This argument for regulation in other fields has much going for it, more
for some types of problems than others. Addressing climate change is an
area where the argument is especially strong. In my own co-authored article
on how corporate governance can be used to address climate change, our
leading conclusion was that corporate governance is quite limited in what it
can do, and aggressive environmental regulation must be the main response

32. See, e.g., Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at 768, 786–88 (discussing the importance
of external regulation).
33. Our Continuing Struggle, supra note 5, at 169.
34. Milton Friday, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility of Business Is to
Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), https://www.nytimes.com/1970/09
/13/archives/a-friedman-doctrine-the-social-responsibility-of-business-is-to.html
[https://perma.cc/LS5C-G3PU].
35. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 37–39 (1991)
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to climate change. 36 Climate change is a massive, global problem over a
long time period. The incentives of even large organizations that
significantly emit greenhouse gases to take big, costly actions right now are
weak relative to the action needed. Finding a constituency group with the
incentives and information to empower within a business to address climate
change is quite tricky.
The argument for external regulation is less strong in other areas. As I
have argued elsewhere, 37 worker protection is such an area. The externalities
outside of a company’s own workers are much less pervasive. And there is
a constituency group with the incentive and information to act effectively
that can be empowered to protect a company’s workers, namely, those
workers themselves. 38
However, relying on other areas of regulation has significant
limitations, even in fields like climate change where the argument for doing
so is strongest. For one, the American political system has become
increasingly dysfunctional, so strong climate change legislation now seems
very hard to achieve. Indeed, my co-authors on the subject 39 were three
environmental law scholars (one American, two Australian) driven to look
to corporate governance for answers out of desperation surrounding the weak
prospect of political solutions.
This dysfunction has many sources. Of particular note for students of
corporate governance is that corporations themselves are major political
players. Even companies that publicly proclaim dedication to addressing
climate change may fund lobbying organizations and political candidates
who oppose legal reforms. 40 This has led ESG activists to focus on proposals
to limit or at least disclose corporate spending on lobbying and political
campaigns. To his credit, Strine has addressed this question, and he quite
vigorously objects to corporate political spending. 41 Strine stresses that
political spending will often go against the preferences of many
shareholders, and that there is a serious agency problem with CEOs choosing
to spend shareholder money on their own preferred candidates and causes.
He suggests a variety of solutions, from companies committing to no

36. Green Boards, supra note 3, at 399.
37. Mandates to Governance, supra note 1, at 887.
38. Employee Primacy, supra note 1, at 336.
39. Green Boards, supra note 3, at 337.
40. Dorothy S. Lund & Leo E. Strine, Corporate Political Spending Is Bad Business,
HARV. BUS. REV. (2022), https://hbr.org/2022/01/corporate-political-spending-is-badbusiness [https://perma.cc/BGP6-E3L5].
41. Id.
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political spending at all to requiring shareholder approval for such spending,
among other ideas. 42
Although I am sympathetic to these arguments and suggestions, I
wonder if Strine has over-emphasized the problems associated with political
spending and under-estimated the legitimate reasons (from a profit
maximization perspective) managers might want to spend to affect
regulation. Regulations presumably do frequently reduce profitability, and
relatively small amounts of spending on lobbying and elections can have big
payoffs. The fact that corporate spending skews heavily Republican may not
just reflect the personal biases of top managers, as Strine argues,43 but may
instead reflect the fact that Republicans general support lower levels of
regulation.
Even when external regulation does get done, under-enforcement can
be a big problem. Agencies that administer rules may be under-funded or
captured by the industry. Here again, Strine recognizes the issue and has a
response: the internal compliance function within corporations. We will
consider that in the next Section.
Finally, despite my somewhat snarky treatment of the attitude of
libertarians like Friedman and Easterbrook to regulatory responses, 44 we
should remember the force of arguments against imposing regulatory
mandates. Extensive regulation can create all sorts of problems.45 For
instance, our system of employment regulation is extensive and complex. 46
It may at least sometimes impose costs that exceeds its benefits. 47 It
sometimes imposes one-size-fits-all rules that are not tailored to the needs
and preferences of all workers. 48 Contrast this with the flexibility of our
system of corporate governance, which mostly imposes default rules that
individual companies may vary. Choosing to protect workers via mandatory
employment regulation rather than through internal governance loses the
benefits of that system of corporate governance. 49

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (discussing libertarians).
See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980).
See Mandates to Governance, supra note 1 (discussing the unemployment system).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Compliance
The under-enforcement objection to external regulation brings us to
another method by which Strine proposes to ameliorate corporate
irresponsibility. Directors and officers have a duty to follow the law. Under
the famous Caremark case, 50 they also have a duty to monitor whether
corporate employees are complying with the law. For several decades
Caremark was famously seen as perhaps the hardest legal theory under
which plaintiffs could prevail. But several recent cases have survived
motions to dismiss, 51 leading to a growing sense that perhaps this is not such
treacherous grounds for plaintiffs after all.
In several recent articles, 52 Strine argues that Caremark and ESG are
two great tastes that go great together.
The argument is pretty
straightforward. Most ESG topics have related external legal rules
associated with them. Climate change has various associated environmental
laws; worker protection has employment and labor regulation. Insofar as
companies work assiduously to comply with regulations, they will also be
promoting related ESG goals. Well-run companies should choose to go well
beyond the bare minimum required to comply with the law, in order to reduce
the chance of legal violations.
Such enhanced compliance will
simultaneously lead to improved ESG performance. In Strine’s words, “[i]f
a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will
simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and
promote compliance with the law.” 53 In a bit more detail, he says:
If directors are seeking to go beyond the legal minimum and to
treat all the corporation’s stakeholders and communities of impact
in an ethical and considerate manner, the corporation is by
definition minimizing the risk of breaking the law. By trying to
engage in EESG best practices, the corporation will have a margin
of error that keeps it largely out of the legal grey and create a
reputation that will serve the company well with its stakeholders
and regulators when there is a situational lapse. 54
Strine and his co-authors helpfully go deeper into the weeds of
compliance and corporate structure to provide insights into what effective
50. In re Caremark, 698 A.2d 959.
51. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019); In re Clovis Oncology Inc., No.
2017-0222, 2019 WL 4850188 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
52. Caremark & ESG, supra note 7; Duty and Diversity, supra note 7.
53. Caremark & ESG, supra note 7, 1885.
54. Id. at 1909.
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programs look like. They argue that the board should think carefully about
compliance and ESG together, and plan how to structure both officer- and
board-level management to achieve effective oversight. 55 They caution
against piling all ESG oversight into one committee, either the audit
committee or the nomination and governance committee (the two most
common options). 56
For the specific area of worker protection, Strine suggests board-level
oversight in an expanded version of the standard compensation committee. 57
That committee typically focuses on the compensation of top executives.
Strine suggests the committee should oversee compensation and
employment practices for the entire workforce, “including not only worker
pay and benefits but also safety, racial and gender equality, sexual
harassment and inclusion, and training and promotion policies.” 58
Here again, Strine’s strategy has much to commend it. He is clearly
right that leaving plenty of room to spare in avoiding legal violations will
also advance ESG goals. His thoughts on board committee oversight also
make a good deal of sense, and show an admirable attention to the details of
corporate governance and how those details affect behavior and policy. 59
But inevitably there are also limits and concerns with this Caremark
strategy. In an area of ESG like climate change, where the impetus for a
corporate governance-driven strategy comes from the lack of effective
regulation and the difficulty of changing that, a legal compliance strategy has
a significant limit. Even going well above the legal minimum to ensure
compliance may not be good enough where the legal minimum is very low
indeed and where the need for changed behavior is very high. That describes
the current situation for climate change and corporate policy. 60
In addition, does Caremark do enough to encourage the kind of
attention to best ESG practices that Strine recommends? The law clearly
allows such behavior (the business judgment rule sees to that). It doesn’t
require such behavior; even with the new Caremark cases, boards can escape
liability with less stringent oversight than Strine advocates. How much does
it encourage such behavior? The combination of risk aversion and a small
chance of liability, along with concerns about reputation and a norm favoring

98.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Caremark & ESG, supra note 7, at 1910–11.
Id. at 1916–17.
See Fair Gainsharing, supra note 6 (discussing board-level oversight).
Id. at 32.
We shall see this attention to detail again. See supra text accompanying notes 94–

60. See Green Boards, supra note 3 (discussing climate change and corporate policy).
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compliance goes some way to encouraging compliance beyond the legal
minimum, 61 but just how far does it go? Good boards should do as Strine
suggests, but plenty of boards are not good. 62
As for Strine’s suggestions on the compensation committee and worker
protection, just how far should we trust a group of directors to identify and
aggressively pursue the best interests of workers? As Strine himself
emphasizes, directors are elected by and beholden to shareholders. 63 Most
directors in public companies are high-level officers at other companies.
Their positions and backgrounds align them with management, not
workers. 64 It takes a high level of empathy and imagination to overcome that
gap and truly understand and act on the best interests of a company’s
employees. Some directors may achieve that level of empathy and
imagination. Most won’t.
C. Reforming Shareholder Activism
If we want to ameliorate corporate irresponsibility within a system
where the board answers ultimately to shareholders, then one approach is to
focus on the behavior of those shareholders. Discouraging shareholder
behavior that pushes companies to be more irresponsible, and encouraging
shareholder behavior that pushes in the opposite direction, should lead to
better outcomes. This involves distinguishing two kinds of shareholder
activism, and figuring out how to discourage the bad kind while encouraging
the good kind. Traditional activism focuses on ways to generate more profit
and distribute it to shareholders, with strategies that are often (though
controversially) characterized as generating short-term profits through
strategies that may endanger the long-term health of a company. 65 More
recent ESG activism focuses on issues like climate change and workforce
diversity. Though generally justified as promoting higher profits in the longrun, it does so in ways that focus on other stakeholder interests in the shortrun.
Strine has repeatedly expressed skepticism about traditional activism,

61. See Penumbra, supra note 2 (discussing compliance).
62. See Green Boards, supra note 3 (discussing good boards).
63. See supra notes 23–26 and accompanying text (discussing beholdenness).
64. Penumbra, supra note 2; see also Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Disney, Good
Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 J. CORP. L. 833 (2007) (discussing directors).
65. Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and Other
Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
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arguing that institutional investors need to be encouraged to focus more on
value in the long run. In one noteworthy article he tied this skepticism to the
interests of workers, suggesting a shared agenda for labor and management.66
In that article, he makes a number of specific suggestions:
• Eliminate classified boards while accepting traditional poison
pills; 67
• Every three years allow shareholders who have held their shares for
at least a year to be compensated for solicitation costs if they
nominate board candidates who receive a specified percentage of
the vote; 68
• Eliminate advisory shareholder proposals, focusing on bylaw
proposals that would have real effect; 69
• Adopt bylaws that require shareholders to approve the pay of top
executives 70 (events have overtaken this proposal, with say on pay
now required for reporting companies); 71
• Discourage activism by shareholders with short positions; 72
• Discourage quarterly earnings estimates; 73
• Various measures intended to align the incentives of fund managers
with the interests of their investors; 74
• Higher taxes on short term capital gains; 75
• A small financial transaction tax; 76 and
• Eliminating the tie between health insurance and employment.77
In a more recent article, he repeats some of these and also suggests
allowing institutional investors to consider the human, not merely financial,
interests of their beneficiaries. 78
66. Common Ground, supra note 6.
67. Id. at 29
68. Id. at 30
69. Id. at 31
70. Id. at 33
71. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203,
124 Stat. 1899 (2010). In a more recent article, Strine suggests revising say on pay to require
votes only every four years, with companies required to disclose four-year plans before those
votes. Fair and Sustainable, supra note 6, at 14–15.
72. Common Ground, supra note 6, at 38.
73. Id. at 38–40.
74. Id. at 44.
75. Id. at 45. More recently, he suggests extending the period for long-term capital gains
from one to five years. Fair and Sustainable, supra note 66, at 18.
76. Common Ground, supra note 6, at 45.
77. Id. at 46–48.
78. Fair and Sustainable, supra note 6, at 9; see also Michal Barzuza, Quinn Curtis &
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That is a lot of worthy suggestions. And recent developments in
shareholder ESG activism suggest things are moving in a direction that
Strine prefers. 79 I disagree with a few of his specific suggestions. On
shareholder proposals, although I agree that bylaw proposals with real
authority should get more use, 80 my discussions with participants in the
shareholder engagement process and comparison with Australia, which lacks
such a process, has convinced me that precatory proposals also play a useful
role. 81 On proxy access for shareholders nominating directors, I think that,
particularly with the growth of ESG activism using this tool,82 it should be
more encouraged than Strine suggests. I wouldn’t limit shareholder proxy
access to every third year and, although I would allow for reimbursement of
expenses for solicitations that receive a certain percentage of the vote, I
would also provide for access to the company proxy, as has become common
through shareholder pressure in recent years. 83 The problem with relying on
expense reimbursement is it creates uncertainty for shareholders
contemplating proposing a slate of director nominees.
More fundamentally, I think this bundle of proposals, while mostly
worthy, has serious limits to how much it can achieve in promoting the
interests of workers or addressing climate change. I have two main concerns.
First, there are severe built-in limits as to how much the biggest institutional
investors 84 can do to effectively engage on ESG matters, even with well
thought out legal rules that make their tasks less hard. These investors have
increasingly large clout through how much of most public companies they
own, but their task in monitoring those companies is enormous. They must
vote in many thousands of annual shareholder meetings, with a number of
proposals to consider in many of those meetings, and director elections in all
of them. Effectively monitoring and engaging with all of those companies
would be enormously expensive. 85 Although funds can justify some of those

David H. Webber, Shareholder Value(s): Index Fund ESG Activism and the New Millennial
Corporate Governance, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 1243 (2020) (providing more on this topic).
79. Green Boards, supra note 3, at Part III.
80. Shareholder Bylaws, supra note 2, at 205.
81. Green Boards, supra note 3, at 355.
82. Matt Phillips, Exxon’s Board Defeat Signals the Rise of Social-Good Activists, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/exxon-mobil-engineno1-activist.html [https://perma.cc/43W8-9TEX].
83. Bernard S. Sharfman, What Theory and the Empirical Evidence Tell Us About Proxy
Access, 13 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2017).
84. In particular, the Big Three (Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street Bank).
85. Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493,
515–16 (2018).
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expenses as a way of advertising to many investors (especially younger ones)
interested in ESG matters, 86 heavy competition resulting in low fees
seriously limits how much they can do. 87
Second, I think there remains a major gap between the interests of even
long-term and diversified shareholders on the one hand, and employees or
future humans who will be most affected by climate change on the other
hand. The move from a short to a long run shareholder value focus goes
some way to reducing the gap, but far from all of the way.
IV.

DR. LEO AND WORKER POWER

At the beginning of the previous Part, I give a quote from Strine laying
out several paths to protecting the interests of workers and other stakeholders
other than shareholders. 88 Part III explores what that quote calls “a more
effective and direct way,” 89 namely, externality regulation and addressing
the incentives and duties of institutional investors, along with invoking the
Caremark duty to oversee legal compliance. But that quote leads with
another option, namely, directly empowering non-shareholder constituencies
within corporate law itself. Particularly, if one thinks of empowering
workers, this path would follow my own preferred strategy for corporate law
reform. 90
In a recent co-authored work in progress, Strine has started to explore
that path, suggesting ways to empower workers directly. 91 In Lifting Labor’s
Voice, Strine gives a qualified endorsement of a codetermination system
where employees are able to elect representatives to the board of directors.
That strikes directly at the heart of the exclusive enfranchisement of
shareholders within corporate law, which in turn is central to Strine’s
argument in favor of the shareholder wealth maximization norm as the
appropriate understanding of fiduciary duty. 92 Thus, with this proposal,
Strine moves from working within the established structure of corporate law,
as he does with the proposals discussed above, 93 and instead contemplates
86. Barzuza, Curtis & Webber., supra note 78, at 1300.
87. Green Boards, supra note 3.
88. See Dangers of Denial, supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing other ways to
protect additional stakeholders).
89. Dangers of Denial, supra note 5, at 768.
90. See McDonnell, supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing directly
empowering non-shareholder constituencies).
91. See Labor’s Voice, supra note 8 (discussing ways to empower workers directly).
92. See supra Part II.
93. Id.
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critical revisions of the American system of corporate governance.
Several elements of Lifting Labor’s Voice are worth emphasizing and
discussing. Strine has an extremely thoughtful and detailed discussion of
some of the design issues involved in implementing board representation for
workers. 94 He and his co-authors discuss a variety of questions. Who would
get to vote? 95 That includes issues such as whether the law would apply only
to workers within the U.S. or worldwide for American companies, the vexing
question of who counts as an employee, and who counts as managers who
would not be given a vote. How much would worker directors get paid and
how would their regular work and board duties be balanced? 96 What would
be the rules for conducting campaigns for worker directors and how would
those elections be administered? 97 How would the board operate, and in
particular, how would one understand the fiduciary duty of worker
directors? 98 Strine and his co-authors have useful ideas on each of these
questions. More basically, they provide an important service in stressing the
importance of thinking about them.
More fundamentally, and in some cases more problematically, the
authors argue that board-level codetermination will only work effectively if
combined with a number of other reforms. 99 These include requiring that all
large corporations be required to consider the interests of major corporate
stakeholders, 100 requiring EESG disclosure, 101 focusing the compensation
committee on broader workforce issues rather than just executive
compensation, 102 using that committee to experiment with more worker
voice a la the German works council model, 103 implementing a variety of
labor law reforms to strengthen unions, 104 and revising the duties of
institutional investors. 105 The argument that board-level codetermination
94. Labor’s Voice, supra note 8, at 1362–80.
95. See supra Section III.A.
96. See supra Section III.B.
97. See supra Sections III.C, III.D.
98. See supra Section III.E.
99. See supra Part IV.
100. See supra Section IV.A (explaining the benefit corporation model, which mirrors one
of the main elements of Senator Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th
Congress (2018); it goes against the approach to fiduciary duty advocated by Justice Strine as
discussed supra Part II).
101. See supra Section IV.B (explaining that the extra “E” is for employees).
102. A reform Strine discussed before. See supra Section IV.C; supra notes 57–58 and
accompanying text.
103. Supra Section IV.D.
104. Supra Section IV.E.
105. Supra Section IV.F; see also supra Section III.C.
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will work only if combined with these other measures is based largely on
observing other countries that have adopted codetermination, especially
Germany, and noting that those countries do not require board representation
in isolation, but have many other worker protections in place as well.
I certainly agree that these various reforms complement each other, and
that board representation would work better with these other measures in
place. A harder question concerns whether effective board representation
requires all of these other measures to be in place, and if not, which measures
matter most and how practically and politically one should best stage various
reforms.
It certainly is possible that widespread adoption of worker board
representation will be effective only in the presence of various other
complementary mechanisms. I have made such arguments myself, focusing
on a rather different set of complementary mechanisms, such as financial and
educational institutions.106 Even to the extent that one accepts the
importance of complementary institutions, one may disagree as to what are
the most important complements. I am less inclined than Strine to think that
EESG disclosure and the fiduciary duty of managers matters that much, and
more inclined to stress the importance of educational institutions, at various
levels. We agree on the importance of financial institutions, although I
would look to a wider range of possibilities, 107 rather than a sole focus on
reforming current institutional investors.
A key question is how important unions are to the prospects for worker
board representation. I am more inclined than Strine to see board
representation as an alternative to unions, rather than as requiring effective
unions as a prerequisite. 108 In part this reflects a political judgment. Unions
have been declining in the U.S. for many decades, and employers have been
very effective at blocking attempts to revise labor law rules and enforcement
in ways that might reverse that decline. I see no good reason to be optimistic
about that changing any time soon. Measures encouraging board
representation (or similarly, works councils) are more novel, and might have
more of a chance at success.
Success at encouraging board representation or works councils (or for
that matter, more unionization) might be more likely if pursued not through
mandatory measures, as Strine mostly seems to contemplate, but rather
106. Employee Primacy, supra note 1, at 376–78; Brett H. McDonnell, Labor-Managed
Firms and Banks (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University) (on file with
author).
107. Id.
108. Mandates to Governance, supra note 1.
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through offering carrots to employers that adopt one of these forms of worker
empowerment. The carrots could be tax breaks, or as Matt Bodie and I have
suggested, they could be loosening of various employment law rules. 109 I
would suggest working at encouraging, not requiring, all three forms of
worker empowerment mentioned here, and seeing what (if anything)
companies choose to adopt. Perhaps board representation will indeed only
follow unionization and works councils, but perhaps it could be the reverse.
Adoption would presumably vary among companies, giving more
information on what works best.
Strine focuses on how codetermination would help protect workers. A
complete analysis needs to consider how it would affect corporate
governance more generally, including its impact on other stakeholders,
including shareholders. I and others have argued that employee involvement
in corporate governance, more so than the involvement of other stakeholders,
would be highly appropriate and effective. Employees have much valuable
information about how a business functions, and incentive to use that
information to improve the business. Governance could also reduce worker
agency problems. 110
Though I have questions on some details in Lifting Labor’s Voice, that
should not divert attention from my strong support and admiration for the
direction this paper takes. A former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme
Court, one of the leading voices in contemporary corporate governance, is
favorably exploring many forms of worker empowerment, including board
representation as well as works councils and expanded unionization. It is a
bold move away from the current American system, coming from someone
who until very recently was right at the heart of that system. Kudos.
V.

CONCLUSION

We have seen quite a progression from Justice Strine to Dr. Leo. Less
than a decade ago, the Chief Justice was defending Delaware’s focus on
shareholders. Corporate law statutes confer power on shareholders alone to
elect directors and sue them for fiduciary duty violations; fiduciaries should
therefore focus on how decisions affect the long-term interests of
shareholders; and Strine did not seem to question whether that was how the

109. Mandates to Governance, supra note 1.
110. Employee Primacy, supra note 1; Mandates to Governance, supra note 1; see
generally GRANT M. HAYDEN & MATTHEW BODIE, RECONSTRUCTING THE CORPORATION
(2021).
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law should be. 111 But that didn’t mean Strine even then did not care about
other stakeholders, especially workers. Indeed, from the focus of corporate
law on shareholders, he inferred that other areas of the law needed to be
strengthened to support workers and other constituencies. 112 Within
corporate law, he analyzed how the Caremark duty 113 and rules governing
institutional shareholders 114 could also help.
But now Dr. Leo may be admitting that these are not enough to do
justice to American workers. Maybe we need to admit workers into the inner
sanctum of corporate governance, along with shareholders, directors, and
officers. His voice, like that of workers, is worth listening to.

111.
112.
113.
114.

See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.A.
See supra Section III.B.
See supra Section III.C.

